Este número monográfico de la revista Co-herencia que tenemos el gusto de presentar es para nosotros un motivo de satisfacción y orgullo. Después de varios meses de trabajo, logramos concretar un valioso conjunto de textos sobre teoría de la historia y la historiografía, dos áreas de investigación que hasta hace unos años eran más bien exóticas en nuestro medio.

Three plausible views—Presentism, Truthmaking, and Independence—form an inconsistent triad. By Presentism, all being is present being. By Truthmaking, all truth supervenes on, and is explained in terms of, being. By Independence, some past truths do not supervene on, or are not explained in terms of, present being. We survey and assess some responses to this.

"Alexis de Tocqueville compte parmi le petit nombre de penseurs dont la réputation ne fait que s’affirmer avec le temps. Depuis la parution de sa Démocratie en Amérique, il y a près de deux siècles, des études innombrables ont souligné la justesse et la perspicacité de sa vision de l’histoire moderne. Dans ce livre, Claude Corbo met en lumière des aspects moins connus de l’homme et de l’œuvre, qu’il connaît de longue date. Au cours de son célèbre voyage de (...) 1831-1832, Tocqueville rencontre non seulement des citoyens de la jeune république américaine, mais aussi ceux qui ont pris figure de vaincus. Il prend le temps d’observer les Autochtones aussi bien en périphérie des villes qu’aux confins que constitue la Frontière. Du 23 août au 2 septembre 1831, visitant Montréal, Québec et les campagnes environnantes, il fait avec ravissement la connaissance des Canadiens français du Bas-Canada. Dans les deux cas, ses rencontres et ses observations lui inspirent des réflexions lucides et sombres à la fois. Des nations autochtones, il écrit sans ménagements: "La ruine de ces peuples a commencé du jour où les Européens ont abordé sur leurs rivages; elle a toujours continué depuis; elle achève de s’opérer de nos jours." Des Canadiens français, il se désole d’avouer que "ce ne sera jamais un peuple nombreux. Tout deviendra anglais autour de lui.""--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Objectives: This study was designed to explore the prevalence and types of stipulations required of investigators by the institutional review board of one institution over a five year period.Design: Stipulations to research proposals were documented from the minutes of the IRB meetings.Setting: Community hospital.Participants: IRB submissions.Main measurements: Number and type of IRB stipulations.Results: Nineteen research submissions were approved without any stipulations. For the remainder, the majority of stipulations related to consent forms .Conclusions: Consent forms appear to be at highest risk (...) for IRB stipulations. Being aware of high risk areas before submission of research proposals may reduce the frequency of stipulations required of investigators. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...) just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

‘Gender identity’ was clearly defined sixty years ago, but the dominant conceptions of gender identity today are deeply obscure. Florence Ashley’s 2023 theory of gender identity is one of the latest attempts at demystification. Although Ashley’s paper is not fully coherent, a coherent theory of gender identity can be extracted from it. That theory, we argue, is clearly false. It is psychologically very implausible, and does not support ‘first­person authority over gender’, as Ashley claims. We also discuss other errors and (...) confusions in Ashley’s paper. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

People with dementia have commonly been excluded from research. The adverse impacts of this exclusion are now being recognized and research literature, position statements, and ethics guidelines increasingly call for inclusion of people with dementia in research. However, few published studies investigate the views of potential participants on taking part in research should they experience dementia-related cognitive impairment. This cross-sectional survey examined the views of people aged sixty and older attending hospital outpatient clinics about clinical research participation if they had (...) dementia and impaired decision-making ability. Over 90 percent of respondents were agreeable to participating in a wide range of research activities, such as cognitive testing, physical measurements, imaging procedures, and blood draws. For drug studies, however, agreement dropped to 60 percent. Altruism was a strong motivator for research participation. In regard to who should be involved in decisions about their participation in research during periods of incapacity, respondents mostly preferred the person they appoint as their substitute decision-maker for healthcare matters or a doctor or health professional on the research team. Over three-quarters expressed interest in making an advance research directive. The study findings are discussed in relation to law reforms in Australia that aim to strengthen respect and inclusion for people with impaired decision-making capacity, especially by providing frameworks for advance planning for research participation. (shrink)

We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the (...) Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...) explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness. (shrink)

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...) end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)

The present article revolves around the notion of universality and its relation to freedom and temporal orientation in contemporary political thought, with a focus on Susan Buck-Morss' notion of universality. The purpose is twofold. Firstly, I discern and critique the historico-political premises of her approach. Secondly, I suggest an alternative historico-political approach to universality addressing the drawbacks of her approach. I present three objections to her approach. Drawing on Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom, I first present (...) a critique of the conceptualisation of freedom on which Buck-Morss' approach hinges, arguing that she overemphasises the moment of liberation. Thereafter, I turn to her reflections on historical orientation. My third objection concentrates on Buck-Morss' concept of universality. As a heuristic tool to expound on my critique, I activate the distinction between fictive and ideal universality as suggested by Étienne Balibar. I contend that Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom efficiently elucidates the questions at stake in Balibar's discussion, as well as how his distinction points to the limits of Buck-Morss' argumentation. Ultimately, I contend that these critical remarks open up for a more dialectical approach to universality as a historical-political problem. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Giving without the expectation of reward is difficult to understand in organizational contexts. In opposition to a logic based on self-interest or a sense of duty, a “logic of gift” has been proposed as a way to understand the phenomenon of free, unconditional giving. However, the rationale behind, and effects of, this logic have been under-explored. This paper responds by first clarifying the three logics of action—the logic of exchange, the logic of duty, and the logic of gift—and then explains (...) how their balanced integration promises to enhance organizational life and outcomes. Having explicated the unique character and contributions of the logic of gift, the paper further suggests practical implications for management. Encouraging the logic of gift fosters more humane relationships within organizations and to enable individuals to be generous in ways that inspire trust and promote creativity. (shrink)

This study was designed to survey the extent to which private companies in Sweden take structural measures within the field of business ethics: Codes of Ethics; Ethics Committees; Ethics Officers and Ethics Training. This was done in two steps. Through a nation-wide telephone survey, a population of "active" companies were identified. These companies received a questionnaire with detailed questions regarding the design, usage and effects of these measures. The percentage of active companies were found to be a high 46%. National (...) and industry characteristics are proposed as explanatory factors. (shrink)

_Europe Thirty Years After 1989_ explores what happened in the former socialist countries during the last thirty years and the reasons behind these events. The authors examine how values, memory, and identity have been transforming these countries since the year 1989.

Tomas Abraham inicia una pesquisa filosofica y no se detiene ante las impugnaciones que dictan el buen gusto y la conveniencia (la que esconde las contradicciones para simular seriedad y rigor intelectual). Nada lo detiene. Observa, analiza, compulsa. Sus preguntas no interrogan esas zonas del discurso para las cuales se han inventado ya benevolas excusas, sino las otras, las peligrosas.Desde 1989, reflexiona Abraham, el factor economico es la clave que permite descifrar los anhelos y las frustraciones de la sociedad. Por (...) que? Porque el factor economico no se reduce a la economia, no se limita a la produccion y a la distribucion de riquezas sino que acusa la visible emergencia de nuevas formas de vida. El factor economico revela el diagrama de las mutaciones culturales. En este ensayo filosofico en el que coexisten una cantidad asombrosa de estilos y tonos, el autor analiza y discute la empresa como nuevo monumento cultural, la demonizacion del estado, las batallas etico-politicas entre intelectuales y economistas culturales, la tarea de los expertos en calidad de vida y su funcion en una nueva sociedad terapeutica. De las historias de vida de los archimillonarios al encuadre historico de la ideologia empresarial, de la puesta en sorna (con el mayor respeto) de la literatura de autoayuda a la meditacion sobre la moral y el dolor en los campos de exterminio, La empresa de vivir, como los libros anteriores del autor, traza una linea osada y firme e incorpora al pensamiento argentino una nueva manera de hacer las cosas. Una nueva manera capaz de abrir discusiones aparentemente concluidas o censuradas, de expandir los efectos de un conflicto intelectual hacia areas desprestigiadas oignoradas, de inaugurar una pasion para abolir la ironia autoindulgente y los entredichos ufan. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We exist only because we inhabit a world in common, embedded within networks of associations between humans and nonhumans. This is endlessly disclosed by our experience of the world. And yet, despite its palpability, it is clear that we have failed to mobilize a notion of the common world into something capable of guiding our modes of thought and collective forms of activity—our attitudes, our affective lives, our politics. How have we arrived here? Bruno Latour's work suggests that an (...) answer can be found in the common world's status as information—its self-evidence works to exclude it from a world of values. What, then, should be done? In his recent work on the modes of existence Latour develops a pragmatic metaphysics inspired by the speculative method of Alfred North Whitehead. Metaphysical speculation becomes a tool for moving beyond the “bifurcation of nature” through the construction of abstractions with which to interpret the pluralism of experience. Rather than thinking of the common world as either a given fact or as a totalizing universal, Latour develops a notion of a common world out of the messiness of experience and, as such, hopes to transform us into beings who would be moved to actively pursue and care for such a notion. (shrink)

No artigo nos damos à tarefa de mostrar e demarcar a presença de uma via extralógica nos diálogos socráticos. É frequente no texto platônico a recorrência a essa via, sendo de fato uma dimensão que se soma ao percurso lógico-racional de uma conversação filosófica, tal como Sócrates tipicamente a empreendia conforme seu método, a maiêutica. O modo como realizamos isso foi o de percorrer algumas obras, principalmente Êutifron e Hípias menor, Lísis e O Banquete, de forma a ressaltar a atuação (...) de elementos humano-afetivos sobre o discurso, que ora incitam ora desfavorecem o diálogo. Essa via aporta então pela perspicácia de abordar, simultaneamente ao desenrolar da pesquisa filosófica pela verdade, a influência de aspectos emocionais, psicológicos, morais e até institucionais. Concluímos que a via extralógica se registra textualmente, e recebe de Platão um reconhecimento equitativo ao plano discursivo dos argumentos, sendo,portanto igualmente valorizada na busca pela verdade. Trata-se de uma via mais sutil, eminentemente filosófica em suas raízes, e que se constitui ao longo da articulação metodológica.AbstractThis paper aims at showing and marking the presence of an extra logic route in the Socratic dialogues. In the Platonic text the recurrence of this pathway is frequent. It is indeed a dimension that adds to the logical-rational way of a philosophical conversation, such as Socrates typically undertook it according to his method, the maieutic. We accomplished this by going over some works, especially Euthyphro and Hippias minor, Lysis and The Banquet in order to emphasize the role of humanaffective elements on the discourse, which sometimes incite and other times harm the dialogue. This way contributes by the perspicacity of addressing, simultaneously the unfolding of philosophical search for truth, the influence of emotional,psychological, moral and even institutional aspects. We conclude that an extra logic route is registered textually, and it receives equal recognition at the discursive level of the arguments. It is constituted during the course of the methodological articulation and it is eminently philosophical in its roots. (shrink)

This article examines three texts in the Acts of the Apostles called “summaries”. These texts illuminate one another, keeping each other internal and external connections, as well as relations with the Gospel according to Luke and the corpus paulinum. The analysis of the literary context of the summaries favors a more accurate view of its content, and a more comprehensive understanding of its message which moreover has repercussions on the patristic tradition not only as apologetic value, but as building the (...) monastic community and paradigm to understand the Church. The summaries are established as the fundamental reports, to which the Magisterium often uses in order to a variety of purposes. (shrink)

Loot Boxes, i.e., virtual items embedded within video games with numerous features reminiscent of gambling, are increasingly widespread among adolescents. LB use is associated with problem gambling in youth, but few studies have been conducted on the association between LB use and gambling behavior considering adolescents. Thus, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not clear. As LB use is a significant and positive risk factor for video gaming severity, and video gaming is associated with problem gambling, we hypothesized that LB (...) use would be related to gambling frequency and problem gambling through the intermediary role of video gaming frequency and problem video gaming. We tested our hypothesis before COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown and during COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown, in Italy. Study 1 was conducted with 1,078 high school students before COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown, and Study 2 was conducted with 1,204 high school students during COVID-19-pandemic-related lockdown. A path analysis was carried out to analyze the significance of indirect effects from LB use to gambling behavior and problem gambling through video gaming and problem video gaming. In both the studies, results showed that LB use exerted significant and positive direct effects on video gaming frequency, problem video gaming, and gambling frequency. Moreover, LB use had indirect significant and positive effects on problem gambling through video gaming frequency, problem video gaming, and gambling frequency. Findings attest that LB use can be related to problem gambling through a greater involvement in videogames. Thus, a specific subtype of young gamblers can develop Gambling Disorder symptoms from the use of LBs and through an intense use of video games. Practical implications for prevention and treatment are discussed. (shrink)

Most philosophers, including all materialists I know of, believe that I am a complex thing?a thing with parts?and that my mental life is (or is a result of) the interaction of these parts. These philosophers often believe that I am a body or a brain, and my mental life is (or is a product of) brain activity. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel argument against this view. The argument turns on certainty, that highest epistemic status that a (...) precious few of our beliefs enjoy. For example, on the basis of introspection, I am certain that I am not in fierce pain right now. But if I am a complex thing like a body or a brain, then introspection might be a causal series of events extended in time. And any such process could go awry. So, if introspection is such a process, then I could gain good evidence that the introspective process has gone awry and that I am, contrary to appearances, feeling fierce pain right now. Therefore, the view that I am a complex thing like a body or a brain forces open the possibility that I cannot be certain that I am not feeling fierce pain right now. Since that is clearly not an open possibility, it follows that I am not a complex thing. I conclude by responding to three objections. (shrink)

Apresenta-se nesse texto as repercussões do Concílio Vaticano II na Igreja particular de Goiás. A fidelidade ao Concílio produziu efetiva participação de todos – presbíteros, religiosas e religiosos, leigos e leigas. Tomando como referências a vivência e experiência de pastor nessa diocese (1967-1998) e diversos estudos, Dom Tomás mostra os aspectos mais relevantes dessa história: as assembléias diocesanas, com participação de leitos (1968); as CEBs e a concretização da opção pelos pobres; as Escolas Bíblicas; a defesa da posse da (...) terra, a Comissão Pastoral da Terra - CPT e o enfrentamento da ditadura militar; a causa indígena; o ecumenismo; o exercício da colegialidade; a articulação dos bispos comprometidos com as CEBs na CNBB; o problema da Visita Apóstólica na diocese; apresenta ainda um balanço de erros e conflitos; e finalmente, relata o Sínodo diocesano (1995) e seus objetivos: 1) Avaliar a situação concreta do povo, seus sofrimentos e suas lutas, para se ter uma visão mais clara da realidade; 2) Julgar à luz da Palavra de Deus;. 3) Desenvolver com mais clareza a missão da nossa Igreja dentro dessa mesma realidade. Palavras-chave : Concílio Vaticano II. Diocese de Goiás-Brasil. Participação. Colegialidade. Abstrat This article written by Archbishop Tomás Balduíno presents the impact of Vatican II in the particular Church of Goiás, emphasizing that the loyalty to the Council produced effective participation of priests, religious and lay people. Given his experience as a pastor in this diocese (1967-1998) and several studies, Bishop Thomas shows the most relevant aspects of this story: the diocesan assemblies, with the participation of lay people (1968); the CEBs and realization of the option for the poor; the Bible Schools; the defense of land tenure, the Pastoral Land Commission - CPT and the facing of the military dictatorship; the indigenous cause; ecumenism; the exercise of collegiality; the articulation of the bishops committed to the CEBs in CNBB; the problem of apostolic visit in the diocese. The article also presents a balance of errors and conflicts, and finally reports the diocesan Synod (1995) and its objectives: 1) Evaluate the concrete situation of the people, their sufferings and their struggles to get a clear picture of reality; 2) To make the judgment of reality in light of the word of God; Develop more clearly the mission of our Church in this reality Keywords : Vatican II. Diocese of Goiás-Brazil. Participation. Collegiality. - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n24p1341. (shrink)

Tomáš Hauer v publikaci věnované soudobým postmoderním teoriím nejprve vysvětluje genealogii pojmu postmodernismus a analyzuje francouzské filosofické myšlení na cestě od strukturalismu k postmodernismu. Na základě této analýzy pak vymezuje současný postmoderní kulturní obrat a zamýšlí se nad rolí veřejného prostoru v postmoderní společnosti. Čtenář se m.j. seznámí s dílem francouzských filosofů J. Derridy, J. F. Lyotarda, G. Deleuzeho, J. Baudrillarda či italského filosofa G. Vattima. Kniha je tak vhodným úvodem do problematiky postmoderního myšlení.

As there is a gap of legal regulation of covenants not to compete in Lithuania, the legal doctrine and the case-law are analyzed in this article. It is recognized in judicial practice that labour laws are not applicable for the regulation of the covenants not to compete. So, the parties, an employer and employee, are free to make agreement on non-competition. There are some suggested principles how to make parties’ agreement on non-competition. Firstly, there should be disputed an adequate compensation (...) to the restrictions that would be made for an employee. Secondly, the restriction of competing should be precisely described, taking into account other issues, such as period of non-competing, employee’s qualification and duties, termination of agreement, etc. It is also proposed to supplement the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania with the rules concerning the conclusion, execution or termination of these covenants. (shrink)

In this paper I asses Davidson’s analysis of action sentences stressing its quantificational structure and its views on prepositions and adverbial modification. Three arguments inspired by Grice’s ideas are deployed against it. First, I point to weird consequences of taking prepositions as defining predicates; second, I show some obstacles for Davidson’s view on adverbs; finally, I raise some doubts about his putative analysis of “negative actions”. From these, I hope that connections among actions, facts and events should be reconsidered in (...) action theory. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

I begin by retracing an argument from Aristotle for final causes in science. Then, I advance this ancient thought, and defend an argument for a stronger conclusion: that no scientific explanation can succeed, if Naturalism is true. The argument goes like this: (1) Any scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity. Next, I argue that (2) any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks (...) one. From (1) and (2) it follows that (3) a scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity, and this regularity does not call out for explanation while lacking one. I then argue that (4) if Naturalism is true, then all natural regularities call out for explanation but lack them. From (3) and (4) it follows that (5) if Naturalism is true, then no scientific explanation can be successful. If you believe that scientific explanation can be (indeed, often has been) successful, as I do, then this is a reason to reject Naturalism. (shrink)

According to Ted Nannicelli, ethical disputes about art today often concern not the controversial attitudes expressed by the works but the ways in which they have been created, that is, as well as interpretation-oriented ethical criticism of art, we find production-oriented ethical criticism. The main question that I explore in this article is: are the interpretation- and production-oriented approaches to ethical art criticism essentially disconnected or can there be a connection between them? I argue that in the disjunctivist view, the (...) two approaches are disconnected, for ethical flaws in the production of artworks are never conditioned by ethical flaws in the attitudes expressed by those works and vice versa. I show that disjunctivism is mistaken and defend what I call contextual conjunctivism. In this view, the two approaches can be connected since attitudinal ethical flaws in artworks can indeed cause ethical flaws in their production and vice versa depending on context. I support this view using several examples of controversies about contemporary art. (shrink)

The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense (...) of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various “vocabularies” with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty’s animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful. (shrink)